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CONTROL OF PANIC SELLING BY
REGULATION OF "FOR SALE" SIGNS
In Barrick Realty, Inc. v. City of Gaiy1 plaintiffs sought to have
the Seventh Circuit invalidate a municipal ordinance2 designed to
prevent panic selling. The Gary, Indiana, ordinance prohibited the
display by any person of "For Sale," "Sold," "Open House," and all
similar signs in residential areas.- The court rejected appellants'
1. 491 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1974), aff'g 354 F. Supp. 126 (N.D. Ind. 1973).
Plaintiffs were a Gary, Indiana, realty company, its president, and a homeowner
who had listed his home for sale by the other plaintiffs. The Seventh Circuit
adopted the lower court's opinion as its own. 491 F.2d at 162. Therefore, much
of this comment refers to the district court's opinion.
2. Gary, Ind., Ordinance No. 4685, July 25, 1972, cited in 491 F.2d at 162-63.
3. Id. The relevant portions of the ordinance provide as follows:
Section 2. It shall be unlawful for any person to construct, place, maintain,
install, or permit or cause to be constructed, placed, maintained, or installed
any sign of any shape, size or form on any premises located in any Residential
District Zoned RI through R7 under Title 6, Chapter 6 of the Municipal
Code of the City of Gary, Indiana.
For purposes of this section the "signs" above mentioned are hereby defined
to mean any structure, and all parts composing the same, together with the
frame, background, or supports therefore which are used for advertising or
display purposes, or any statuary, sculpture, molding, or casting used for
advertising or display purposes, or any flags, bunting or material used for
display or advertising purposes, including, but not limited to, placards, cards,
structures or areas carrying the following or similar words: "For Sale,"
"Sold," "Open House," "New House," "Home Inspection," "Visitors Invited,"
"Installed By," or "Built By."
Section 3. Any person violating any of the provisions of this Ordinance
shall upon conviction, be fined not less than Ten ($10.00) Dollars nor more
than Five Hundred ($500.00) Dollars to which may be added imprisonment
for a period not to exceed 180 days.
Id. It is unclear from paragraph 2 of Section 2 whether the ordinance operates as
a nonrestrictive ban on all commercial signs. But both parties argued as though
the ordinance bans only "For Sale" and similar signs. Appellants state in their
brief that "[t]he ordinance is not directed at banning commercial advertising
within commercial districts and does not ban all signs on the basis of aesthetics
[sic]." Brief for Appellants at 11, Barrick Realty, Inc. v. City of Gary, 491 F.2d
161 (7th Cir. 1974). The district court and the Seventh Circuit both assumed that
the ordinance forbade only certain real estate signs. The ordinance's legislative
history clearly shows the purpose of the ordinance is to exclude "For Sale" signs.
Brief for Appellees at 5-21, Barrick Realty, Inc. v. City of Gary, 491 F.2d 161
(7th Cir. 1974). The city's brief even refers to the "For Sale Sign Ban Ordinance."
Id. at 8-9.
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constitutional arguments and affirmed the decision of the district
court upholding the ordinance.4
The Gary ordinance represents a major extension of the philosophy
underlying conventional anti-blockbusting legislation. Its significance
becomes apparent when the distinction between blockbusting and
panic selling is considered. Blockbusting, also known as panic ped-
dling, has been called "the practice of some unscrupulous real estate
agents to scare property owners in a neighborhood into selling their
property below its value by telling them that members of a minority
-for example, Negroes-are moving in."5 Panic selling, on the
other hand, need not result from the direct inducements or persua-
sion of a blockbuster. It "occurs when a resident who is otherwise
disposed to remain in a neighborhood succumbs to any one or more
of a number of pressures to move out when it appears that a minor-
ity racial group is beginning to enter."' It is apparent that the
inducement of panic selling is a necessary element of blockbusting
and that panic selling, since it can occur without the intervention of
blockbusters, is a much broader problem than blockbusting.7
Conventional legislative attempts to halt blockbusting have not
dealt directly with the problem of panic selling but have focused
4. 491 F.2d at 165.
5. 112 CONG. REc. 18,177 (1966) (remarks of Representative Bingham). The
district court in Barrick defined blockbusting as "the practice of directly inducing
or persuading an individual to sell his home by representations as to the entry into
his neighborhood of blacks or other minority groups." 354 F. Supp. at 134-35. It
has also been defined as the process through which individuals engaged in the
real estate business stimulate and prey "on racial bigotry and fear by initiating and
encouraging rumors that negroes [are] about to move into a given area, that all
non-negroes [will] leave, and that the market values of properties [will] descend
to 'panic prices' with residence in the area becoming undesirable and unsafe for
non-negroes." Contract Buyers League v. F & F Inv., 300 F. Supp. 210, 214
(N.D. II. 1969). See generally Note, Blockbusting: A Novel Statutory Approach
to an Increasingly Serious Problem, 7 COLUm. J.L. & SoO. PRoD. 538 (1971);
Comment, Blockbusting: judicial & Legislative Response to Real Estate Dealers'
Excesses, 22 DE, PAUL L. REv. 818 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Block-
busting: Judicial & Legislative Response]; Note, Blockbusting, 59 GEo. L.J. 170
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Note, Blockbusting]; Note, Legal Control of Block-
busting, 1972 URBAN L. ANN. 145 [hereinafter cited as Note, Legal Control of
Blockbusting].
6. 354 F. Supp. at 135.
7. Some reasons why Negro migration into white neighborhoods "so often de-
generates into Negro replacement of residents of other ethnic groups" are suggested
in E.P. CONSER, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE REALTOR, NATIONAL ASSOcIATION OF
RIEAL ESTATE BomAs 9 (1963), quoted in Rice, Bias in Housing: Toward a New
Approach, 6 SANTA CLARA LAW. 162, 162-63 (1966).
(Vol. 10:323
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instead upon regulation of the individual blockbuster.8 The empha-
8. Of the three major substantive categories of formal anti-blockbusting measures
(control of representations, control of solicitations, and control of conduct), the
proscription of certain representatives is the most commonly utilized and is probably
the most effetctive against overt blockbusting practices. Note, Legal Control of
Blockbusting, supra note 5, at 164, 169. The federal anti-blockbusting provision,
42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) (1970), adopts this approach by making it unlawful "[flor
profit, to induce or attempt to induce any person to sell or rent any dwelling by
representations regarding the entry or prospective entry into the neighborhood of a
person or persons of a particular race, color, religion, or national origin." The
courts have interpreted this provision quite liberally. See, e.g., United States v.
Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115 (5th Cir. 1973) (indirect references to
minorities actionable); United States v. Mintzes, 304 F. Supp. 1305 (D. Md.
1969) (false representations actionable); Brown v. State Realty Co., 304 F. Supp.
1236 (N.D. Ga. 1969) (unsuccessful inducements actionable). Even with the
broad construction given it by the courts, the scope of the anti-representation
statute is necessarily limited. For example, it applies only to individuals making
certain representations with an expectation of financial gain. Further, the federal
statute requires some showing that the representations were such as to constitute a
pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of rights granted by the
statute before the Attorney General will act. 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (1970). Private
individuals, however, can file suit without showing a pattern or practice of re-
sistance. Id. § 3610, 3612. A more extensive statute may sweep too broadly into
areas protected by the first amendment. In DeKalb Real Estate Bd. v. Chairman
& Bd. of Comm'rs of Rds. & Revenues, 372 F. Supp. 748 (N.D. Ga. 1973), a
county anti-blockbusting ordinance making it unlawful, inter alia, "for any real
estate broker '. . . to make any representation in connection with the purchase,
sale, or rental of any residential property, that there is or may be physical deteriora-
tion of dwellings in any block, neighborhood or area' " was held unconstitutionally
vague and overbroad. Id. at 755.
It should be noted that the blockbuster can evade the statute by using subtler
techniques, including long-term placement of "For Sale" or "Sold" signs in racially
transitional neighborhoods to raise white homeowners' fears and induce panic
selling. See Brown v. State Realty Co., 304 F. Supp. 1236, 1238 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
The primary deficiency of the federal law, however, may not be so much the
wording as the lack of sufficient personnel to enforce it. Note, Blockbusting, supra
note 5, at 182. Although the blockbuster may be able to evade the federal statute,
it is still nossible that he will be caught by more stringent local laws. A provision
of the Federal Civil Rights Act specifically states that the Fair Housing Act shall
not be construed as preempting state or local regulations in the anti-blockbusting
field, as long as they do not infringe the rights protected by the Civil Rights Act.
42 U.S.C. § 3615 (1970).
The majority of states and municipalities legislating with respect to blockbusting
also have laws proscribing representations made to cause neighborhood change.
See Note, Legal Control of Blockbusting, supra note 5, at 159. An example of one
of the broader statutes of this type is the Gary Civil Rights Ordinance which
provides:
It is an unlawful discriminatory practice for [any person, for profit]
(1) to represent that a change has occurred or will or may occur in the
composition with respect to race, color, religion or national origin of the
owners or occupants in the block, neighborhood, or area in which the real
property is located; or
1975]
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sis upon restricting the would-be blockbuster's representations, solid-
(2) to represent that this change will or may result in the lowering of
property values, an increase in criminal or anti-social behavior, or a decline in
the quality of schools in the block, neighborhood, or area in which the real
property is located.
Gary, Ind., Civil Rights Ordinance 4458, cited in Brief for Appellants at 11-12,
Barrick Realty, Inc. v. City of Gary, 491 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1974), af'g 354 F.
Supp. 126 (N.D. Ind. 1973). This ordinance goes further than the federal ant-
blockbusting law by proscribing the making of such representations by all persons
and not just by real estate brokers. Also, it does not require a "pattern or practice
of resistance." Certain state statutes have even eliminated the requirement of acting
for financial gain. See, e.g., b. ANN. CODE art. 56, § 230A (1972). A potential
problem with these laws is that the "commercial speech" exception may not be
activated without the "for profit" requirement, and thus they may be subject to
attack under the first amendment. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54
(1942).
In addition to proscribing certain kinds of representations, state and municipal
laws also deal with blockbusting by regulation of real estate licenses. Some of
these statutes have led to litigation. See, e.g., Summer v. Township of Teaneck,
53 N.J. 548, 251 A.2d 761 (1969); Abel v. Lomenzo, 25 App. Div. 2d 104, 267
N.Y.S.2d 265, aff'd, 18 N.Y.2d 619, 219 N.E.2d 287, 272 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1966).
The effectiveness of these regulations is questionable, however, when the block-
busters are speculators acting for themselves and are therefore not in need of
licensing, and when real estate commissions are composed principally of members
of the real estate industry who may be reluctant to act against blockbusting col-
leagues. Note, Blockbusting, supra note 5, at 173; Note, Legal Control of Block-
busting, supra note 5, at 162. Since public access to such commissions is usually
limited, the commissions have even less incentive to act. Id.
Another blockbusting control is the restraint of uninvited solicitations. Anti-
solicitation ordinances cannot be genuinely effective unless they ban all types of
solicitation. Ideally then the ban should encompass use of the mails and telephone,
real estate signs, and other forms of commercial advertisement, since mass solicita-
tion of sellers by these methods is an important weapon in the blockbuster's assault
upon homeowners. See Note, Blockbusting, supra note 5, at 171; Note, An Anti.
Blockbusting Ordinance, 7 HARv. J. LEGIS. 402, 404 (1970); Note, Legal Control
of Blockbusting, supra note 5, at 164. An anti-solicitation ordinance of such wide
sweep, however, would penalize honest real estate brokers and prohibit even harm-
less solicitation and thus may be construed to restrain entirely the conduct of a
lawful business. The Seventh Circuit in Barrick emphasized the availability of
alternate means of advertisement. 491 F.2d at 164. Legislation on a more modest
scale prohibiting solicitation by telephone, mail, canvassing, loudspeakers, handbills
and advertising signs has already been enacted. See, e.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. §
26.1300(203) (b) (1970).
The third category of blockbusting legislation is the control of conduct. Al-
though crude forms of harassment-intimidation, hiring young blacks to turn over
garbage cans and throw bricks through windows, hiring black welfare mothers to
stage parades down the streets of racially transitional neighborhoods-may still be
used by some blockbusters, the typical blockbuster has become more sophisticated.
Accordingly, legislation designed to curb such flagrant conduct is a less important
means of control. Note, Blockbusting: A Novel Statutory Approach, supra note 5,
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tations and conduct reveals the basic flaw in conventional anti-
blockbusting legislation, which rests on the philosophically naive
premise that blockbusting can be halted by stopping blockbusters.
The premise dictates regulation of the blockbuster as the means of
controlling, albeit indirectly, neighborhood destabilization and panic
selling and is partly responsible for the limitation of statutory pro-
hibitions to only the most overt blockbusting violations.9
Conventional anti-blockbusting measures have limited application.
Since they apply only to those engaged in blockbusting for profit
and proscribe only the most flagrant practices, they are of little avail
to neighborhoods that are extremely sensitive to current or imminent
changes in home ownership, where no intentional blockbusting act is
necessary to cause panic selling. Even traditional innocent methods
of solicitation may be harmful.'0
Close examination of the Gary ordinance reveals that it is more
than a different approach to the control of panic selling 1 because it
implicitly recognizes that the broader problems of panic selling and
neighborhood destabilization can be controlled only by decreasing the
fears of white residents. The ordinance deals directly with these
9. See Note, An Anti-Blockbusting Ordinance, supra note 8, at 404. Another
major deficiency in the conventional approach is the inapplicability of many of
these regulations to speculators and non-licensed dealers who buy and sell property
for their own accounts. See, e.g., CHICAGO, ILL., ORDINANCE ch. 198.7-B, § 9
(Sept. 11, 1963), cited in 8 RAcE REL. L. REP. 1208, 1209 (1963). A further
shortcoming is the lack of appropriate sanctions for violators. See, e.g., Shaker
Heights, Ohio, Ordinance 61-97, August 29, 1961, cited in 8 RAcE REL. L. REP.
262 (1963), which provides a $50.00 fine for the first offense. The relatively small
fine can hardly be considered a deterrent to blockbusting activities when the po-
tential profits involved are so great.
10. Note, An Anti-Blockbusting Ordinance, supra note 8, at 405. For instance,
it has been shown that the mere presence of "For Sale" signs can catalyze panic
selling. See, e.g., Brown v. State Realty Co., 304 F. Supp. 1236 (N.D. Ga. 1969);
Summer v. Township of Teaneck, 53 N.J. 548, 251 A.2d 761 (1969). As the
district court in Barrick pointed out:
A proliferation of "for sale" signs not only intensifies [the fear of substantial
pecuniary loss from declining property values], but also tends to transform it
into reality by further depressing prices. Many white residents desire to re-
main in changing neighborhoods provided they can be maintained on a stable,
integrated basis. The evils they fear most-crime, overcrowding, depressed
property values, and being left behind-need not come to pass if stability can
be achieved. A steadily increasing number of "for sale" signs tends, no less
than overt blockbusting practices, to undermine any hope of such stability.
354 F. Supp. at 135.
11. The district court in Barrick thought otherwise: "The only difference be-
tween [conventional anti-blockbusting] laws and the [Gary ordinance] lies in the
means employed to attack the problem of panic selling." 354 F. Supp. at 135.
1975]
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critical problems by removing a significant source of residential in-
security-the proliferation of "For Sale" signs.22 Since a neighborhood
can be intentionally "busted" only by inducing panic selling,13 the
Gary ordinance's premise-alleviating white homeowners' fears will
curb panic selling--should apply a fortiori to blockbusting.14
Despite their usefulness in combatting panic selling in racially
transitional areas, sign regulation ordinances" have met forceful re-
sistance.-0 The affirming decision in Barrick, and the upholding of a
similar ordinance by the Missouri supreme courty7 may encourage
other municipalities to enact comparable legislation. There are a
number of arguments, however, that can be raised challenging the
validity of a Gary-type ordinance.
The threshold questions are, first, whether the locality has the power
to enact the ordinance, and, second, whether the ordinance is contrary
to the and-blockbusting provision of the Federal Fair Housing Act of
1968.18 The district court found the Gary ordinance plainly authorized
by Indiana's broad grant of powers to municipal corporations.10 Ab-
sent state preemption 20 or denial, the powers of the city are limited
only by the federal and state constitutions.
2
'
12. Brief for Appellees at 10, Barrick Realty, Inc. v. City of Gary, 491 F.2d 161
(7th Cir. 1974).
13. This is true by definition. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
14. Three other elements of the Gary ordinance could be profitably incorporated
into anti-blockbusting laws: applicability to all persons (although first amendment
problems should be recognized), abolition of mens rea, and provision for criminal
sanctions against violators. See note 3 supra.
15. A number of municipalities have passed sign regulation ordinances similar to
the Gary ordinance. See, e.g., ST. Louis, Mo., IRnv. MUNICIPAL CODE §§
740.010 to .040 (1960); UNxrRsrrY CITY, MO., MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 34-44,
reproduced in Comment, The Constitutionality of a Municipal Ordinance Pro-
hibiting "For Sale," "Sold," or "Open" Signs to Prevent Blockbusting, 14 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 686, 687-89 nn.12, 14 & 15 (1970).
16. See Note, Legal Control of Blockbusting, supra note 5, at 168.
17. Jerome L. Howe Realty Co. v. City of St. Louis, No. 56852 (Mo., Dec. 10,
1973) (unreported case upholding ST. Louis, Mo., Rv. MUNICIPAL CoDE §
740.010 to ;.040 (1960) ).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) (1970).
19. 354 F. Supp. at 131. The statute grants cities the power to regulate or
prohibit any act that endangers the public health, safety or welfare, or causes in-
jury to property, and grants similar powers regarding the custody, possession or
ownership of real property that endangers the public welfare or causes injury to
property. IND. ANN. STAT. CODE §§ 18-1-1.5-6 (Burns 1974).
20. Plaintiffs alleged state preemption but pointed to no particular provision to
support their claim. 354 F. Supp. at 131.
21. Id. See, e.g., General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 202
Ind. 85, 172 N.E. 309 (1930) (reasonable regulations on commercial advertising
['Vol. 10:323
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Regarding the second question, the district court noted that the
federal anti-blockbusting provision.-- does not conflict with the Gary
ordinance and that there is no conflict in policy, since the federal law
is designed to accomplish the same end to which the ordinance is
directed.2 3 Both measures are aimed at providing fair housing oppor-
tunities for minorities by eliminating panic selling pressures on white
residents.
Having resolved the conflict of policy matter in favor of the city, the
district court turned to the constitutional issues. Plaintiffs claimed
that the ordinance violated a number of constitutional rights,24 con-
tending that the ordinance intruded upon the first amendment right of
free speech and denied them due process and equal protection of the
law as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.2 5
Since the Gary ordinance proscribes only certain commercial signs
that may induce panic selling,2 plaintiffs' first amendment argument
is not persuasive.2 7 A recent Supreme Court decision 28 reaffirming the
are valid exercise of police power to protect the safety, health, morals and general
welfare). See also 7 E. MCQuILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 24.380 (3d ed.
1968).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) (1970). See note 8 supra for text of statute.
23 354 F. Supp. at 131. See also 42 U.S.C. § 3615 (1970) ("no federal pre-
emptior" proviso). Plaintiffs also made the interesting but unsuccessful argument
in the district court that the ordinance violated a federal statute (id. § 3604(d) )
that makes it unlawful to represent to any person because of race, religion or
national origin that any dwelling is not available when it is in fact available. The
court reasoned that even if the prohibition of "For Sale" signs on a lot did
amount to a "representation" that the house is unavailable, plaintiffs' argument
would still fail because the "representation" is not directed at anyone because of
his race, religion or national origin. 354 F. Supp. at 132.
24, 354 F. Supp. at 132.
25. Id. at 134, 136.
26. "For Rent" signs do not carry the same message (abandonment of the
community) to wary white homeowners that "For Sale" and similar signs do, and
thus need not be included in the anti-panic selling ordinance. Id. at 137. But the
ordinance must ban all "For Sale" and similar signs. In DeKalb Real Estate Bd.,
Inc. v. Chairman & Bd. of Comm'rs of Rds. & Revenues, 372 F. Supp. 748 (N.D.
Ga. 1973), an ordinance that prohibited brokers but not homeowners from post-
ing such signs was held to violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Id. at 754-55. See note 33 and accompanying text infra.
27. There exists sufficient empirical evidence for the legislative judgment that
"For Sale" signs promote panic selling. See, e.g., 354 F. Supp. at 135; Brown v.
State Realty Co., 304 F. Supp. 1236, 1237-38 (N.D. Ga. 1969). See also Brief for
Appellees at 5-18, Barrick Realty, Inc. v. City of Gary, 491 F.2d 161 (7th Cir.
1974).
28. Pittsburgh Press v. Pittsburgh Comnm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376
(1973). The Court, citing Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), held
1975]
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distinction between commercial and regular speech, has further dimin-
ished the chances of successfully urging a first amendment challenge to
a Gary-type ordinance. The district court in Barrick emphasized the
commercial character of the regulated signs concluding that the poten-
tial public benefit from the ordinance far outweighed the potential
harm to realtors and homeowners who wished to use the signS. 29
Plaintiff's contention that the ordinance denied due processs0 also
failed. They argued that the proscription of "For Sale" and similar
signs does not reasonably relate to the ordinance's objective, the reduc-
tion of panic selling.3 ' The available evidence indicates, however, that
there is sufficient basis for the city to believe otherwise.82
An equal protection argument can also be made that the Gary
ordinance is unreasonably broad because it fails to differentiate be-
tween residential areas where panic selling is an immediate threat and
areas where it is not. Plaintiffs did not raise this particular argument,
although there is no apparent reason for restricting the placement of
signs in such places as all-black neighborhoods. Indeed, the ordinance
would act to impede the transfer of property in those areas while
yielding no real return in terms of anti-panic selling effects. 33
that a newspaper's classification of employment ads in sex-designated columns is not
protected under the first amendment because it is commercial speech. In Chresten-
sen, the progenitor of the commercial speech exception, a unanimous Court held that
reasonable regulations upon "purely commercial" speech are not entitled to first
amendment scrutiny. 316 U.S. at 54.
29. 354 F. Supp. at 136. The Seventh Circuit also emphasized the fact that
alternate means of communication are available to plaintiffs. 491 F.2d at 164.
30. Due process, in the context of governmental regulation of private activity,
requires that the law not be unreasonable or arbitrary and that the means chosen
bear a real and substantial relation to the ends sought. Nebbia v. New York,
291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934). In Nebbia the Court also noted that property owners'
rights may be "subordinated to the needs of other private owners whose pursuits
are vital to the paramount interests of the community." Id.
31. Brief for Appellants at 34-41, Barrick Realty, Inc. v. City of Gary, 491 F.2d
161 (7th Cir. 1974); cf. DeKalb Real Estate Bd., Inc. v. Chairman & Bd. of
Comm'rs of Rds. & Revenues, 372 F. Supp. 748, 754 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
32. See, e.g., Brown v. State Realty Co., 304 F. Supp. 1236 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
See also note 27 supra.
33. Comment, The Constitutionality of a Municipal Ordinance Prohibiting
"For Sale," "Sold," or "Open" Signs to Prevent Blockbusting, 14 ST. Louis
U.LJ. 686, 710. Plaintiffs in Barrick urged that the ordinance was overbroad only
as applied to new homes and empty lots. Brief for Appellants at 23-24, Barrick
Realty, Inc. v. City of Gary, 491 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1974). The Seventh Circuit
dismissed this particular argument as "simply an additional substantive due
process argument." 491 F.2d at 164.
There are other equal protection issues that may be raised against the Gary
[Vol. 10:323
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One solution to the above problem is suggested by a St. Louis
ordinance. Under the traditional equal protection analysis, a legislative classifica-
tion must be sustained unless it is "patently arbitrary" and bears no rational rela-
tionship to a legitimate governmental interest. See, e.g., United States Dep't of
Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973); Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc.,
348 U.S. 483 (1955); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106
(1949). In applying the equal protection clause to social and economic legislation,
the Supreme Court has indicated that great latitude will be given the legislature in
making classifications. See, e.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968). The
lower courts have applied the Supreme Court's deference to legislative classifica-
tions in consistently holding that brokers can be singled out for treatment by anti-
blockbusting laws. Because of the large amount of evidence showing that they play an
important part in blockbusting, (see, e.g., Chicago Real Estate Bd. v. City of
Chicago, 36 III. 2d 530, 224 N.E.2d 793 (1967); 1969 DUKE L.J. 733, 739-40),
brokers are thus left with only one significant equal protection argument: the
ordinance may work to segregate blacks. According to the appellees in Barrick,
"the evidence discloses that Gary does not have the problem of opening all-white
neighborhoods to minorities. The problem is just the opposite, i.e. making it
easier for whites to stay after minorities move into a neighborhood." Brief for
Appellees at 45, Barrick Realty, Inc. v. City of Gary, 491 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1974).
The district court, however, had dismissed this argument for lack of factual sub-
stantiation. 354 F. Supp. at 136.
A similar argument was raised and discussed in DeKalb Real Estate Bd., Inc. v.
Chairman & Bd. of Comm'rs of Rds. & Revenues, 372 F. Supp. 748 (N.D. Ga.
1973) (DeKaIb was decided after Barrick). Defendant county provided evidence
that the cause of panic selling was the presence of "For Sale" signs displaying the
names of brokers known to sell primarily to black families. Id. at 755. This evi-
dence was introduced in an attempt to show a rational relationship between the
existence of "For Sale" signs carrying a broker's name and the presumption that
the broker had committed an act of blockbusting. The DeKalb ordinance banned
all "For Sale" signs bearing the names of real estate brokers and made the posting
of such signs prima facie evidence of a blockbusting violation. Ordinance to
amend the code of DeKalb County, Ga. Part II, ch. 13, reproduced in id. at
756-59. The court noted that private homeowners were allowed to post "For
Sale" signs and were not subject to the non-discrimination requirements of the
Federal Fair Housing Act. 372 F. Supp. at 755. These facts viewed in light of the
official purpose of the ordinance-stabilization of neighborhoods-strongly sug-
gested that the ordinance's effect, if not real purpose, was to "freez[e] in past dis-
crimination" and "den[y] blacks a fair opportunity to find suitable housing." Id.
Were its purpose to prevent the influx of blacks, the ordinance would be subject to
the strictest judicial scrutiny, 491 F.2d at 165, and would probably be held to
violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), in which an ordinance prohibiting the operation of
laundries except in brick or stone buildings without permission of city officials was
found violative of the equal protection clause because it affected 150 Chinese
aliens but left 80 non-Chinese operating under the same conditions unmolested.
The DeKalb court went on to find that this ordinance violated due process. 372
F. Supp. at 754. The flaw in the DeKalb ordinance was its attempt to make an
otherwise ambiguous act-the posting of certain "For Sale" signs-presumptively
a crime requiring mens rea. The Gary ordinance makes no such presumptions re-
garding mens rea. Instead, it imposes strict liability for violations, thus entirely
avoiding the mens rea problem.
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ordinance 3 establishing a commission to grant permits to post signs
upon application and payment of a $5.00 fee, if it determines that the
area is not subject to being "busted." This approach may not be
appropriate, however, when substantial parts of the city are subject to
blockbusting and panic selling pressures.ns
Careful drafting enabled the Gary ordinance to avoid another equal
protection problem. The ordinance proscribes the posting of "For
Sale" and similar signs by all persons. The importance of the word
all is demonstrated in DeKalb Real Estate Board, Inc. v. Chairman
and Board of Commissioners of Roads and Revenues.-6 Since it has
been shown that the mere presence of "For Sale" signs can cause panic
selling, whether the signs are posted by realtors or homeowners should
be irrelevant. Therefore, the DeKalb court reasoned, the broker-home-
owner classification violated the equal protection clause because it
bore no reasonable relationship to the purpose of the ordinance37
Of lesser import than the first and fourteenth amendment arguments
was plaintiffs' contention in Barrick that the Gary ordinance made it
more difficult for blacks to move into previously all-white neighbor-
hoods and thus was racially discriminatory in violation of the thir-
teenth amendment. 38 The court pointed out that even if the ordinance
caused a reduction in the number of blacks moving into certain areas
of the city, that effect would still be outweighed by the ordinance's
promotion of stable, integrated neighborhoods39
34. ST. Louis, Mo., Rev. MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 740.010 to .040 (1960).
35. Apparently this is the situation in Gary. See 354 F. Supp. at 134. By way
of contrast, it has been estimated that vast migrations from the central city since
1960 have resulted in the vacating of 20Vo of the total housing stock in St. Louis
and the emptying of people from whole areas of the city. D. MANDELKER & R.
MONTGOMERY, HoUSING IN AmERICA: PROBLEMS & PERSPECTIVES 177 (1973).
36. 372 F. Supp. 748 (N.D. Ga. 1973); see note 33 supra.
37. 372 F. Supp. at 755; see note 33 supra.
38. 491 F.2d at 164.
39. Id. at 164-65. Other constitutional arguments made by plaintiffs were that
the Gary ordinance infringed the right to travel and freedom of contract. The
right to travel was urged on behalf of sellers, who, it was argued, would have this
right curtailed by the inability or difficulty in selling their homes without the use
of "For Sale" signs. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), the case relied
upon by appellants, is easily distinguished. The statute in question in Shapiro
had as a specific objective the exclusion from the state of poor persons who needed
or may need state welfare aid. The Gary ordinance at most makes it more diffi-
cult to sell and move-it restricts no one from moving at any time. Shapiro also
involved the denial of basic necessities of life to needy persons during the requisite
residency period. The Gary ordinance does not create the substantial hardship to
[Vol. 10:323
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CONTROL OF PANIC SELLING
The Barrick decision shows that a carefully drafted sign regulation
ordinance designed to stop panic selling can pass constitutional
muster.4 1 Panic selling, however, can be caused by a multitude of
factors not generally susceptible to control by conventional and-block-
busting legislation. The Gary ordinance deals with only one of these
factors. The significance of the case therefore lies not so much in its
identification of a possible model law as in its suggestion that compre-
hensive legislation addressing these other factors can be sustained by
the courts.
Herbert Jung
sellers encountered by the welfare applicants in Shapiro. 354 F. Supp. at 133.
The freedom of contract argument has run an inconsistent course since Lochner
v New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and has been moribund since West Coast Hotel
v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). For several decades the Supreme Court has not
invalidated any state economic regulation on freedom of contract grounds. In
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963), the Court said: "We have re-
turned to the original constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute their
social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected
to pass laws."
40. Municipalities wishing to enact Gary-type ordinances should keep in mind
the overbreadth issue in considering whether provision for a St. Louis-type com-
mission would be appropriate for their communities. See notes 36-38 and ac-
companying text supra.
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